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Abstract
The introduction of RFIDs in the supply chain by the use of an Electronic Product 
Code (EPC) has recently brought a lot of attention concerning privacy and security.  
These concerns have been raised by many people including the discussions made in [17]
pertaining to RFID exploits, viruses, and worms and [42] concerning ONS security.  
Without a proper analysis of these threats we cannot determine proper ways to defend 
against them.  Recently a group of Carleton University associates have created a paper 
[1] analyzing the general overview of possible security threats to an EPC based RFID
systems based on the STRIDE model and the methodology proposed by the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).  This analysis will be applied to various 
RFID frameworks to determine possible advances that can be introduced to deal with 
the numerous security and privacy issues.  Throughout this paper we will discuss and 
apply this threat analysis to the open source frameworks known as Accada and 
Singularity with a main focus on Accada as it has been deployed as an open source 
platform used for research and development.
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Introduction
RFIDs have been around for many years and were first deployed in WWII as a 
means of identifying friendly aircrafts.  Recently RFIDs have been introduced into the 
supply chain by the use of an Electronic product code (EPC) developed by the MIT
Auto-ID Center and currently operated by EPCglobal Inc.  This EPC is a unique number 
associated to an RFID tag that is placed on articles such as products and shipment 
pallets.  Information pertaining to the actual product is not stored on the tags and is 
instead accessed through the EPC Information Services (EPCIS) network.  Each company 
using the system has their own private database containing the information about their 
products.  These private databases can then be accessed with limited privileges by 
partner companies requiring information on your merchandise.  A standardized 
EPCglobal RFID system consists of 4 levels used to properly organize the reading and 
distribution of RFID data, these areas being the ID system, the Middleware, the 
Discovery Service and the Information Service.  Each level is a collection of various 
hardware and software components.  To begin we have the ID system which consists of 5
RFID tags, readers and the appropriate reader software.  The ID system is the process in 
which RFID data is wirelessly accessed from the tags by the readers.  From here the 
information is set to the Middleware where it is properly filtered and aggregated.  Now 
that we have the EPC data we can access its valuable information by connecting to the 
Discovery Service and receive a URL used to access this data.  This URL will grant us 
access to information regarding that product from the manufacturer’s local EPCIS.  The 
process of retrieving this information from a partner’s EPCIS is known as the 
Information Service.  With this newly acquired data we can now store it in our own local 
EPCIS. 
Figure 1: EPC network architecture [Diekmann et al., 2007]6
RFID tags
A typical RFID tag consists of 3 parts, the antenna, the enclosure and the chip.  
The chip contains two types of memory: a non-volatile memory known as EEPROM 
stores information while the chip is not being powered, and volatile memory known as 
RAM is used during computation on the tag.  Using the readers, the data stored on the 
tags can be access in two different ways depending on the type of RFID tag.  There are 
three main types of RFID tags: 
Passive Tags
The main feature of a passive tag is that it does not contain an internal source of 
power.  This allows the size of the tag to be very small. Hitachi is the current leader in 
physical tag size with measurements of 0.05 x 0.05 millimeters.  Power is obtained by the 
tag by collecting a very minute amount of energy from the radio frequency signal sent 
out by a reader.  Returning a signal is done using a technique called backscattering 
where the signal received from the reader is modulated and reflected back to it.  
Therefore if a tags data needs to be wirelessly accessed one must be in range of a reader 
to power the tag.  Passive RFID read distances range from about 10 cm to a few meters.  
Proximity cards, or commonly known as smart cards are an example of a low range 
passive tag.  Longer range tags are being used in areas such as the supply chain by 
implementing EPC standards.  The communication range of a passive tag depends on 
two factors: the need for a very strong signal to power the tag and the small amount of 
power available for the tag to respond to the reader.  These two factors limit the range 
between reader to tag and tag to reader. Constraints such as these can cause problems 
within a dynamic operation.  Consider a shipping container which just arrives and 7
needs to access the RFID tag data.  The reader will operate by connecting to each tag 
one-by-one.  Not only will this increase the amount of time required to access every tag, 
but it will also increase the chance of interference.  Since passive tag do not use internal 
batteries, are very limited in memory size, and are very small they are currently sold at a 
minimum price of 5 cents with a purchase of 100 million or more tags.  The following 
figures are a few examples of passive tags:
       Figure 2           Figure 3  Figure 4
Active Tags
Unlike the passive tags, an active tag contains its own internal power source.  
This alone allows the tag to accomplish much more than a passive tag ever could.  
Having an internal power source however drastically increases size and cost of the tags.  
The factors that limit a passive tags range are nullified by the use of the internal power 
source in active tags.  An active tag does not receive its power from a reader allowing
the tag to operate by receiving very low level signals from the reader.  Once the tag has 
received the signal from the reader it can respond with a high level signal using its own 
internal power.  Not having these constraints eliminates many problems in a dynamic 
system because the reader does not have to access each tag one-by-one.  Having an8
internal power source also increases the available read distance of the tags.  An active 
tag’s read range currently can operate at a range of around 100 meters or more.
Semi-passive tags
Similar to an active tag, semi-passive tags contain an internal source of power.  
However this power source is only used to power the chip and is not used to return a 
signal to a reader.  To return a signal a semi-passive tag uses the same methods as a 
passive tag by backscattering the signal received from the reader.  Another possible use
of the internal power source is to store energy from the reader to be able to return a 
signal in the future.
EPCglobal Class 1 Generation 2 tag
In December 2004 EPCglobal approved the new RFID tag known as a Class 1 
Generation 2 tag.  This new tag has become the new standard for low cost RFID
technology in the supply chain replacing the previous Class 0/1 and ISO tags.  While 
improving on the features of previous tags the Class 1 Gen 2 tag is also designed to meet 
emerging Ultra High Frequency (UHF) regulations in various regions to accommodate 
the use in worldwide deployment.
Speed
Unlike previous tags which operate at a single communication speed a Class 1 
Gen 2 tag has the ability to run at four different speeds.  At top speed a Gen 2 system 
can theoretically read 1000 tags per second.  However, achieving these speeds would 
require an area insulated from RF noise. By increasing the read speed we are also 9
decreasing the reliability, therefore in areas with high RF noise we would use lower 
speeds in the range of 100 tags per second to increasing the read reliability.
Q protocol and Symmetry
A tag on the outer edge of a readers range will experience only short burst of 
power from the reader and can therefore make it very difficult to access.  The Q protocol 
proven affective in previous Gen 1 tags addresses this issue by passing short simple 
queries between the tags and the reader.  The reader begins by issuing a query and each 
tag responds with a randomly generated number.  The reader then sends out an
acknowledgment request using one tags random number.  The tag holding the random 
number is now able to communicate with the reader.  With this connection the reader 
can encrypt the commands by performing a bit-by-bit exclusive OR (XOR) using the 
random generated number issued between the tag and reader.  Once the tag has been 
successfully read it is put in “sleep” mode until the reader has completed accessing the 
other tags.  Every tag that is asleep is removed from the reader’s lists to allow easier 
access to the more difficult to read tags.  Once every tag has been read a “wake-up” 
command is sent to each tag to reactivate them.  In a typical Gen 1 system the sleep and 
wake-up commands are sent multiple times to increase the accuracy of the final 
inventory.  To refine this process a Gen 2 tag uses a dual-state symmetry scheme.  This 
allows a new inventory count to be created without the tags needing to be put to sleep 
or woken up.  To accomplish this, the reader begins by setting each tag in state A.  Once 
a tag has been read using the appropriate random number it is put in state B.  Once a tag 
in state B has been read again it is put back into state A.  Repeating this process of 10
switching a tag between two states allows the reader to go through the entire inventory 
in a similar way to the previous method of multiple sleep and wake up calls.
Anti-collision with Multiple Readers
With the use of multiple readers many problems can arise.  The first problem is 
known as the “dense-reader” problem.  While a reader can output a powerful signal to a 
tag, the tag can only respond with a very minimal signal.  Having too many readers 
communicating to various tags can drown out this faint signal response from a tag.  To 
deal with this issue, Gen 2 tags new signaling mode isolates tag responses into a side 
channel that is easier to access.  Using the Miller sub-carrier algorithm we can specify 
side channels of varying widths according to the overall noise conditions.  This means 
that we can specify channels that are not being used by the reader and therefore will 
reduce the risk of interference.  Gen 2 tags can also use FM0 which is a faster algorithm 
used in current ISO standards but is much more susceptible to interference.
Another problem that can arise is having two or more readers try to 
communicate with the same tag.  The problems that we face here are concerning the 
state of the tag.  As mentioned before, a tag will be in either state A or state B.  If two 
readers are trying to read the same tag around the same time they will each change the 
tags state accordingly.  Now both readers’ inventory counts have been changed, and this 
is where the problem arises.  With the use of the proper applications this problem can 
usually be avoided by allowing only one reader to access the tag; however Gen 2 has 
improved on this by introducing the use of sessions.  A session accommodates the 
grouping of various readers according to how they are used.  In other words, we can 11
eliminate the confusion between various readers by grouping them by the type of reader 
and where they are used.  For example, let’s say a warehouse consists of two types of 
readers: mobile and stationary.  Using sessions we group the stationary reader separate 
from the mobile readers.  This will allow both reader types to initiate tag reads without 
accidentally changing the state of a tag currently used by another session.  
Memory
An EPC tag’s memory consists of four different memory banks.  We consider 
each banks memory address to start at 00h.
Reserved memory:  If passwords are being uses then the kill and access passwords 
are stored here.  The kill password is a 32-bit value stored between 00h and 1Fh that is 
used to render the tag unresponsive once it is no longer needed.  If no kill password is 
set then it operates as a zero-value password that is permanently read/write locked.  
The access password is also 32-bit value stored between 20h and 3Fh used to gain access 
to the tag.  If no access password is set it does the same as the kill password and sets 
itself to a zero-value password and is permanently locked.  Unlike the access password, 
the kill password cannot run when it does not exist to eliminate wrongful termination.
EPC memory: the main parts of EPC memory are CRC-16 (16 bit cyclic 
redundancy check), PC (protocol-control) and EPC.  The 16 bit CRC is used to protect 
the PC+EPC value by having the tag backscatter the CRC-16 during operation.  At 
power-up of the tag the CRC-16 is computed on the PC+EPC values and stored in EPC 
memory 00h to 0Fh.  The 16 PC bits contain physical layer information that is stored from 12
10h to 1Fh.  The first five bits are used for the length of the PC+EPC value.  Bits 15h and 
16h are reserved for future use and are currently set to 002 for Class 1 tags.  The final 9 
bits consists of the numbering system identifier (NSI).  The first bit at 17h is used to 
identify whether or not it is an EPCglobal application.  If this bit contains a logical 0 then 
it is seen as an EPCglobal application and bits 18h to 1Fh are defined in the EPCglobal tag 
data standards.  If bit 17h contains a logical 1 then it is not an EPCglobal application and 
bits 18h to 1Fh will contain the entire Application Family Identifier (AFI) defined in 
ISO/IEC 15961.
TID memory: Tag identifier (TID) memory contains an 8-bit ISO allocation class 
identifier at 00h to 07h.  Anything above 07h shall contain sufficient identification 
information to uniquely identify custom commands and optional features supported by 
the tag based on the class identifier.  The remaining bits may also contain tag or vendor 
specific data such as a tags serial number.  The TID memory is also linked with the EPC 
data in a manufacturer’s EPCIS therefore making it impossible to switch the data 
between two tags.
User memory: A tag may contain but does not always contain User memory.  This
allows for user-specific data storage.  An EPCglobal application with user memory shall 
be encoded using the EPC standards defined in the EPCglobal Tag data standards and a 
non EPCglobal application with user memory shall store the Data Storage Format 
Identifier (DSFID) from 00h to 07h defined in ISO/IEC 15961.  Anything above 07h will be 
as define in ISO/IEC 15962.13
The major risks associated with RFID
Business process risk: A direct attack on an RFID system could undermine the 
business processes originally intended to be enabled by the RFID system.  In other 
words, a company whose main system relies on RFID for tracking will not be able to 
process orders and keep track of inventory in an orderly and timely fashion.
Business intelligence risk: If an attacker were to gain access to a companies RFID
system, they could potentially access valuable information and use it against them.  An 
example of this would be if someone were to gain access to Wal-Mart’s RFID system.  In 
theory the attacker may be able to gain information on the more expensive items that 
Wal-Mart carries.  Using this information the attacker could then track down and steal 
the containers holding these multiple expensive items.  Another option that an attacker 
has is to sell this information to a rival who can use it to their advantage.
Privacy Risk: Privacy is directed more towards an individual and there everyday 
lives.  Information about a person or a group of people can be used by a company to 
market their product to the appropriate people.  With RFID tags being hidden inside 
items such as clothing a company can scan someone’s RFID tags without their 
knowledge and offer them products that relate to their style.  Depending on the amount 
of privacy a person actually expects this can be seen as a great new feature or on the 
other hand an invasion of privacy.  With the introduction of RFIDs into other items such 
as phones and car keys we may never know what kind of valuable personal information 
will be disclosed.14
Externality risk: An RFID system could also bring risk to non-RFID systems that 
are networked with the system.  Through the use of Internet Protocols (IP) and badly 
configured readers an attacker could gain access to computers and valuable information
on the network.  With this, the attacker could potentially gain power over the entire
system.
STRIDE
To conduct our analysis we will be using the security threat model known as 
STRIDE: Spoofing identity, Tampering with data, Repudiation, Denial of service, and 
Elevation of privilege.  Some threats can simply disrupt the inventory system and others 
can be used for personal gain.
Spoofing identity
Spoofing is when an attacker successfully poses as authorized user of this system.  
An RFID system can be susceptible to many different types of spoofing threats.  Here are 
a few examples: 
- An attacker spoofing one or more legal tags would disrupt the company’s 
internal inventory.  This would make the company assume that it has more stock 
than it actually has and would disrupt the internal shipping and receiving 
system.
- An attacker spoofing a legal reader however is much more significant threat 
because it could be use for personal gain.  If the attacker were to perform an 
unauthorized inventory check they could offer the information to a competitor 
which can then use that to its advantage. 15
Tampering with data
Data tampering occurs when and attacker is able to create, modify or delete stored 
data.  With the proper techniques data tampering in most cases can be avoided although 
system that do not implement them properly are still at risk.  Here is a list of possible 
data tampering threats:
- If an attacker was able to modify the data of an EPC tag they would disrupt the 
internal system of a company.  
- Adding tags to a company’s inventory can have the same affect as spoofing a tag.  
Authentic tags could have been procured from another company selling the 
same item and used to disrupt the system.
- An Attacker that can gain access to the kill command of tags could simply 
destroy the information on every tag that it can access.  Although this password 
would be very difficult to get, once they have it they could walk through a store 
or have a hidden reader periodically kill every tag it could access.
- Removing or physically destroying a tag is also seen as data tampering.  If an 
attacker were to do this unnoticed they could easily walk out of the store with an 
RFID-less product, and would therefore not be detected.
- Because the wireless channel between tag and reader is seen as potentially 
insecure an attacker could modify the return signal from a tag.  This will have the 
same affects as modify the data on a tag itself.
- If a product is off its warranty an attacker could modify the data on the tag or 
steal a tag from a similar product to reestablish the warranty or even refund.  16
Repudiation
Repudiation is when a user denies that a certain action was performed when there is 
no evidence to prove that in fact the action did occur.  If there are no proper non-
repudiation protocols introduced then the RFID system could be affected by threat such 
as these:
- Lack or proof to show that a tag has been read by a reader.  A user could say that 
they have not received a shipment and blame either the manufacturer or the 
shipping company.
- The manufacturer of a certain product could deny having information on a 
product with a specific EPC number.  This would allow the manufacturer to also 
deny services such as warranty, repairs, or return.
Information disclosure
Information disclosure occurs when information from a tag has been illegally 
accessed by an unauthorized user.  In information disclosure the main threat is to ones 
privacy.  Here is a list of possible threat affected by information disclosure:
- Someone walking down the street carrying RFID enabled products is illegally 
scanned to determine what these items are.  With this kind of information an 
attacker could pick out people carrying certain products for various reasons.  
One of these reasons could be for company marketing.  If an attacker working for 
a designer clothing company discovers that someone is wearing a lot of their 
products, they would know to target them with product opportunities over say 
someone wearing simple jeans and t-shirt.  This could also be done inside a retail 17
store by installing a reader at the entrance.  When the user walks they are offered 
various deals on similar products by an employee or by looking at an LCD
screen.
- Walking around carrying RFID enabled devices could make it a lot easier for 
someone to steal what they want from you.  Consider someone walking around 
with an expensive RFID enabled product in their pocket such as a phone or car 
keys.  An attacker could then target that specific person and steal from them.
- Just like spoofing a reader, if tag information is disclosed in a warehouse an 
attacker could sell this information to a competitor.
Denial of Service
A Denial of Service attack (DoS) is when an attacker successfully manages to deny 
services to an authorized user.  There are many ways this can be done and it is not 
always easy to prevent against.  Here are some examples of possible DoS attacks: 
- Devices known as blocker tags are used to disrupt the signal between tag and 
reader.  Using one of these devices the reader cannot access the information on a 
tag and the person holding the blocker tag can freely walk out of a store carrying 
items that have been blocked from the reader.
- Using a type of metal enclosure known as a faraday cage an attacker can easily 
shoplift items by insert them inside this enclosure and simply walking out the 
store.  The faraday cage is used to block incoming and outgoing signals from a 
tag.18
- Tags have a very weak return signal when they are talking to a reader.  If an 
attacker was able to broadcast a more powerful signal they could potentially 
drown out the weak tag signal. 
- An RFID system is also susceptible to traditional internet DoS attacks against the 
servers gathering EPC data from the readers and against ONS.
Elevation of privilege
Elevation of privilege defines a threat where an unauthorized user or a user with 
very little privileges elevates their status on the system to grant them access to areas that 
they were previously unauthorized to go.  Here is an example:
- An attacker or unauthorized user that raises their status to system administrator can 
have total control over a system and can add malicious code or delete valuable 
information. 
Threat Analysis
In our security analysis we will be following the evaluation functions proposed 
by Michel Barbeau and Christine Laurendeau in [2] and modeling after the results found 
in [1] in relation to two open source RFID frameworks known as Accada and 
Singularity.  These evaluation functions are based on the methodology proposed by the 
European Telecommunications standards (ETSI) with a few modifications.19
Figure 5: Likelihood of threat [Barbeau and Laurendeau 2007]
Figure 5 is used to determine the likelihood of a threat.  This is done by looking 
at the motivation of the attacker and the technical difficulties that an attacker must 
overcome.  The motivation of an attacker is defined as the motivation needed to carry
out the attack path, whether it is “low”, “moderate”, or “high”.  The difficulties 
associated with the attack are evaluated as “none” in which very little work is required, 
“solvable” where moderate amount of work is required to overcome obstacles, and 
“strong” where the difficulties are seen as very complicated and close to impossible.  
Using the determined likelihood we can move on to the next evaluation function to 
determine the risk of the threat.
Figure 6: Risk evaluation function [Barbeau and Laurendeau 2007]20
With the evaluation function shown in Figure 6 we can determine the risk of the 
threat by looking at the likelihood we previously obtained from Figure 5 and the impact 
this threat would have on the system.  The measurements of the impact are evaluated as 
“low” where the attack results in small outages, “medium” if these outages create
minimal financial losses, and “high” if a large financial loss is noticed while outages are 
occurring more often and affecting many users.
In our evaluation we have assumed that the attacker is working from the outside 
with no physical access to the components or the RFID infrastructure involved.  
However, this doesn’t stop the attacker from having information on both the 
components and infrastructure being used.  To conduct this analysis we will discuss the 
techniques used by the two frameworks followed by an overall threat analysis at each 
step in the architecture.  These steps being ID system, Middleware, Discovery Service, 
and Information Service
Figure 7: Accada architecture21
Figure 8: Singularity architecture
ID System
Accada: Reader module
The reader module that has been developed for Accada was designed based on 
the specifications in the EPCglobal Reader Protocol.  The EPCglobal Reader protocol 
specifies current requirements that must be satisfied by the reader module.  These 
requirements mainly consist of data dissemination, filtering, aggregation, writing to 
tags, and external triggers.  Not only does the reader implement the mandatory features 
it also implements those that are seen as optional.  Optional features added in the 
Accada reader are virtual tag memory service (VTMS), the adaptive filters to compute 
the aggregates, and the surrogate mode.  The virtual tag memory service developed is 
used to facilitate the interaction between tag and reader by eliminating RFID
inconveniences such as limited memory size and limited read range.  To operate the 22
VTMS the host needs to simply provide key-value pairs to a set of tags.  The reader then 
looks at the VTMS to determine the proper memory block to write to.  If the tag write 
succeeds a backup copy of the data is stored in the VTMS.  Now that we have a backup 
copy we only need to access the tag when we need to write to it or kill it.  If writing to 
the tag fails due to lack of power the key-value pair is stored in the VTMS for a later 
time when the tag comes back into reader range.  However if writing to the tag fails 
because of lack of memory then the reader will receive and error message and will store 
the key-value pair in the VTMS.  The adaptive filters are used to smooth out the noise 
from the collected RFID data and to help deal with false negative reads.  When 
implementing the reader module we can proceed in three different ways: First, by the 
use of an integrated computer containing the needed software known as a surrogate.  
Using the surrogate method we can easily deal with multiple readers and those that 
have proprietary message transport bindings and limited resources.  Another method is 
to have the software embedded on the reader itself.  Finally for testing purposes we can 
also currently avoid the need of reader hardware with simulation software.  The 
EPCglobal Reader Protocol implemented by Accada abstracts from the EPCglobal Air 
Interface Protocol because it allows the application developer to be shielded from RF 
communication details.  Although this has its disadvantages by preventing the use of 
the advanced features of an air interface.  Features specific to an air interface include the 
denser reader mode introduced with the Class 1 Gen 2 tags.  The EPCglobal Reader 
Protocol currently allows access to a tags memory however it is not possible to perform 
command such as read, write and kill without the use of an application.23
Singularity: Device Manager
Included in the Singularity framework is a Device Manager (DM) which is used 
in a similar way as the Accada Reader module.  The Device Manager is used to 
configure and manage reader devices.  When the Device Manager initializes it will 
determine what physical devices it is responsible for and will configure them 
accordingly.  Supported by this framework is the “logical reader” aspect which 
combines readers from different areas into one that will send reader events to the 
middleware process known as the Event Manager.  Unlike Accada, Singularity does not 
support the VTMS service; therefore security features facilitated by the VTMS will not be 
relevant to the Singularity framework.
ID System Threats
Because the communication channel between tag and reader is potentially seen 
as an insecure connection we can assume that many threats associated to RFID will take 
place here.  To begin our security analysis let us look at the causes and effects of the first 
threat of the STRIDE model.
Spoofing
With the new Class 1 Gen 2 tags explained above a few new security features 
have been added including the CRC-16 and the 16 bit pseudo random number.  
However without the available on-chip memory we cannot apply stronger 
cryptographic functions such as MD5 or SHA-1.  In current EPC Class 1 Gen 2 tags the 
security used is a simple XOR function between the access password and the pseudo 
random number shared between tag and reader.  By eavesdropping on the signals we 24
can determine the access password from the random number and the XOR function that 
we have intercepted.  Therefore as discussed in the spoofing threats, a malicious reader 
that successfully breaks the Class 1 Gen 2 tags security can impersonate a legal reader.  
Although the EPC data on a tag seems to be meaningless to an average person, a rival 
company or thief could use this information to their advantage.  With this unauthorized 
reader we can also copy tags that have been scanned.  We can therefore rank the 
motivation of such a threat as “high” because the attacker can sell this information for 
personal gain.  We can also rank this as a “solvable” problem since it is theoretically 
possible to determine the access password of a tag.  The impact of such a “possible” 
threat can be seen as “high” resulting in a “critical” risk.
Tampering with data
For tampering of data we will be looking at the data stored on a tag and the data 
transmitted from tag to receiver.  The first thing that an attacker would need to do in 
order to affect the data that is stored and shared is to determine the 32-bit PIN access 
password.  By eavesdropping on the wireless connection an attacker can determine the 
pseudo random number and the XOR encrypted access password shared between tag 
and reader.  Using these two values the attacker can easily determine the access 
password of the tag.  Now that the attacker has the access password to a tag, using a 
Class 1 Gen 2 reader they can access, delete, or modify information from the tag.  
Possible exploits that could be taken advantage of in this case can either be used to 
disrupt the company’s internal system or could also be used for personal gain.  
Disrupting the company’s internal system can be done by simply modifying or deleting 
the data from EPC tags that can be accessed.  This is not seen as a big problem since 25
there is minimal financial loss caused by the disruption in the business process.  
However, if an attacker were able to determine one products access password and 
another products kill password they could easily use that to their advantage to steal 
from the company.  If one of these products is much more expensive then the attacker 
can simply use the cheaper tag on the more expensive item.  This is easier said than done 
because we cannot simply switch the EPC data between the two tags.  This is because of 
the unique tag information stored in the locked TID memory.  The TID memory once 
written cannot be modified, therefore making it impossible to switch EPC data between 
two tags.  The “easiest” way to do this would be to just switch the RFID tags in the same 
way barcodes have been switched for years.  However this does not seem very practical 
and it would be very easy to get caught.  Therefore what we would need to do is 
determine the access password to the cheaper product that we will be “purchasing” and 
the kill password to the product we will actually be getting.  Obtaining the access 
password can be done in different ways depending on the mechanism used to scan the 
RFID tags.  One way would be to bring the product up to a check out counter or price 
check where they will be accessed by readers.  Another way would be to determine the 
access password when the shipment arrives at the store.  This would also be a good time 
to determine the kill password of the other product because this requires a power 
analysis of the tag as discussed in [30].  Now that the attacker has the passwords that he 
needs he can begin by creating a copy of the less expensive products tag.  Using this 
newly made tag the attacker can attach it to the expensive product and kill its actual tag.  
All the attacker needs to do now is purchase his product with the fake RFID tag.  Once 
the company realizes what has happened the attacker will be long gone.  Another way 
to kill a tag that is much easier then determining the kill password is to use a device 26
known as a RFID-Zapper which has recently been demonstrated in [37].  This method 
uses a strong electromagnetic field to destroy a tag indefinitely.  Seeing as this method is 
a lot easier to accomplish than finding the kill password we will use this technique as a 
means of killing the tags in our evaluation.  The results concluded by [1] indicate that
the motivation of an attacker to perform a data tampering attack on the ID system is 
moderate because the attacker would simply be disrupting the company’s business 
process, however with the aforementioned tag switching attack the motivation towards 
such an attack increases to “high” because the attacker will now have some personal 
gain in doing such an attack.  The technical difficulties are easier said than done to 
overcome because they include the determining the access password and killing a tag.  
However this is still theoretically possible and therefore the difficulty is seen as 
“solvable”.  With these findings the result shows the likelihood to be “possible”.  
Moving on to the impact related to this type of threat we can say that it has a “high”
affect on the company’s business operation while having substantial financial losses.  
Therefore we can conclude that this threat is a “critical” risk and should be dealt with 
appropriately.
Repudiation
Currently due to the lack of non-repudiation protocols in the EPCglobal network 
infrastructure used by Accada and Singularity a company can easily deny that a 
shipment has arrived.  The only evidence that can be used is a time stamp, but indeed 
this is not proof.  We can see that this can easily be used for financial gain therefore the 
motivation towards such a threat is seen as “moderate”.  The only difficulty that we will 
face in this situation is the laws that will be broken.  Therefore that clearly makes this a 27
“solvable” threat.  This threat will also have a “medium” impact because there will be 
some financial and disruption to the system.  Since Accada and Singularity have not 
been able to improve on the repudiation threat at the ID system level we are still faced 
with the results found in [1] that the likelihood would be “possible” and the risk would 
be “major”.
Information disclosure
As shown in the spoofing threat, by eavesdropping is it theoretically possible to 
retrieve EPC data through the wireless connection between tag and reader.  In other 
words this is a disclosure of information.  Seeing as the effects of this threat are very 
similar to that of a spoofing threat we can say that they share the same results.
Denial of Service
As shown in the tampering with data threat it is theoretically possible to 
determine the access password by simply eavesdropping on the connection between tag 
and reader by determining the XOR function and the pseudo-random number.  Also, 
again according to [30], we can theoretically determine the kill and access password by 
doing a power analysis.  With these passwords we can do similar things to disrupt the 
internal system.  Using the kill password we can simply connect to various tags and 
send the kill command.  Using the access password we can also do a similar type of 
attack by removing all the available data from the tag.  Both of these methods will deny 
readers from accessing the tags because according to the readers the tags are no longer 
there or they do not contain any EPC data.  28
The next method proposed in [1] is to use an RFID jamming attack where a 
powerful transmitter would broadcast strong signals on the same frequency as the tags.  
As mentioned this type of attack is possible and is not very difficult to do, however with 
such a powerful emitter there is a good chance FCC laws will be broken.  Therefore we 
suggest a similar mechanism known as RFID blocker tags.  Currently RSA has discussed 
in [16] two methods in which a blocker tag can be used.  The two methods are based on 
the types of singulation known as ALOHA and tree-walking.  The Q protocol supported 
by Class 1 Gen 2 and applied by Accada and Singularity is a type of ALOHA 
singulation.  A general RFID blocker tag simulates all the possible RFID tags and this 
causes collisions between the legal tags and the blocker tag simulating it.  In 
consequence this renders all the tags inaccessible.  A blocker tag can also be made to 
simulate a specific tag if information from the tag is previously known.  Therefore using 
a blocker tag an attacker can successfully deny access to all or specific tags without 
breaking any current laws.
As mentioned before, determining the access password is theoretically possible 
as well as creating a Blocker tag.  This implies that in a general RFID framework the 
difficulties towards this threat are “solvable”.  However, with the virtual tag memory 
service (VTMS) employed by Accada these DoS threats will create very minimal affect 
on the system.  As soon as a tag is entered into the system it is stored in the VTMS.  If 
information is needed from a tag and the tag is not in the vicinity of the reader then the 
information is simply retrieved from the VTMS.  The only time the DoS attacks will have 
an effect on the system is when a reader tries to write to a tag and in this case the 
information will be stored in the VTMS for later use when the tag is back in range.  29
Therefore if the information is removed or if the kill command has been sent out to the 
tags the readers will notice that they can know longer see them.  Eventually someone 
will realize that these tags have not been around for awhile and will begin investigating.  
Once they determine that the tags have been disabled they can easily resolve the issue.  
Therefore this increases the difficulty of a DoS attack over other frameworks.  In other 
words we can reset the difficulty back to “strong” using the Accada framework.  Seeing 
as an attacker will not have any financial gain with this type of threat we can set the 
motivation to “low”.  With a “low” impact to the system we can conclude this to be a 
“minor” risk with the determined likelihood of “unlikely”.
Elevation of privilege
EPC tags do not carry information regarding privileges like some other RFID
devices such as passports.  Since an attacker does not have physical access to the system 
this could create a great deal of problems with elevation of privilege in the ID system of 
a supply chain RFID framework.  In this case we will look at possible programming 
flaws in the reader through the wireless connection to hopefully change the 
configurations to support different RFID tags.  Seeing as this is almost impossible to do 
without a physical connection we can see that the results determined correlate with 
those found in [1] with motivation = “low”, difficulty = “strong”, likelihood = 
“unlikely”, impact = “low”, and risk = “minor”.30
Threat Motivation Difficulty Likelihood Impact Risk
Spoofing of identity High Solvable Possible High Critical
Tampering with data High Solvable Possible High Critical
Repudiation Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Information disclosure High Solvable Possible High Critical
Denial of service Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Elevation of privilege High Strong Unlikely High Critical
Table 1: ID system threat analysis
Middleware
Accada: Filtering and Collection Middleware module 
Once a reader captures proper tag data it notifies the middleware so that it can 
perform the proper steps of filtering and collection.  Here we will have multiple readers 
sending data to the middleware to properly aggregate the data from all the readers to 
eliminate redundant reads and to perform various types of filtering.  In other words the 
middleware will create a single interface for multiple readers to connect to.  This allows 
applications to create a standing query and subsequently subscribe to it.  A standing 
query is simply a query that is repeated multiple times over a period of time.  Using the 
subscription to this query we configure the readers according to the EPCglobal Reader 
Protocol.  With this readers can determine whether the RFID data is significant to an 
application.  Once a reader captures data that is relevant it notifies the middleware 
which combines all data retrieved from readers according to the pre-determined 
standing query schedule of the subscribed applications.  Using this method allows the 
readers to efficiently use the available bandwidth by increasing the sampling rate when 31
targeting a specific group of tags or by turning off a reader’s connection completely to 
transfer the available bandwidth to another reader.  The interface used between the 
filtering and collection middleware and the next step towards the EPCIS module is 
known as an Application Level Event (ALE) interface.  The ALE standard defined by the 
EPCglobal is used to create XML reports based on the activity made by the EPC tags.  
These XML reports contain a high-level description of what operations to perform and 
EPC tag information such as the duration of activity and company product information 
used for grouping.  The current company or one of their partners then sends this 
information to the EPCIS module to store it for later use.
Singularity: Event Process Manager
Singularity’s middleware filtering and data collection is similar to Accada and is 
known as the Event Process Manager (EPM).  Between the DM and EPM is the Service 
Component Bus (SCB) which deals with the subscription of the events that the EPM will 
handle.  Events are transferred between the DM and the EPM by notifying the EPM 
through the Message Space.  From here the EPM filters the events received from the DM 
and can publish them to the EPCIS.
Middleware threats
Unlike the other three processes, the middleware does not have any outside 
connection without through one of these mentioned processes.  The main threats 
associated to the middleware are concerning the available filtering and collection 
utilities.  Possible security holes were recently discovered by students at the Vrije 
University in Amsterdam and they are discussed in [17].  These possible threats involve32
exploits such as buffer overflows and SQL injections along with other threats including 
RFID worms and viruses.  These threats utilize the available memory on a tag to insert 
malicious code used to do a variety of hostile acts on the system.  Let us first begin with 
possible exploits starting with SQL injections.  The statement “SQL injection” clearly 
depicts that this is some way of introducing SQL code into the information stored on an 
EPC tag.  This is usually done by including a “;” somewhere in the data.  An example of 
this at the stage of inserted the EPC data in the SQL database would be a command such 
as this 
INSERT INTO EPCISlibrary VALUES ( ‘%id%’, ‘%data%’)
where the data value looks something like “apples’); -insert SQL code-”
This will force the database to complete the two SQL commands separated by the 
semicolon.  Even with very little available memory on a tag, an attacker could insert 
commands such as 
drop table <tablename>
which will delete the entire SQL database.  Another possible exploit is found in 
middleware designed using languages such as C and C++ and is known as a buffer 
overflow.  An RFID tag contains information regarding the amount of information 
stored on the tag.  By changing this information using illegitimate readers and tags a 
legal reader could accidentally read in more data than expected causing a buffer
overflow.  This buffer overflow will cause the unexpected data to overwrite on top of 33
previous data stored on the tag.  By included shell commands into this unexpected data
an attacker can theoretically take control of a system.
Using these exploits and known holes in widely-used network services an 
attacker can theoretically propagate RFID viruses and worms throughout the system.  A 
virus spreads by attaching itself to a tag, entering the system and extending itself onto 
new tags.  Unlike a virus, a worm is self-replicating over both RFID tags and network 
holes and does not require user activity to spread. 
Although these threats seem to be of a great concern, the minimal amount of 
available memory on Gen 2 tags limits the possibility of such attacks.  Distributed RFID
frameworks such as Accada and Singularity also tend to take care of these issues during 
the filtering process.  In the case of a buffer flow, Accada and Singularity cannot be 
infected since they are written in java which is completely invulnerable to such a threat.  
Databases systems such as MySQL and Oracle also support their own SQL injection 
filtering techniques.  An example of this is the mysql_real_escape_string() command 
used by MySQL which detects unwanted characters that would cause an SQL injection.  
The motivation of an attacker towards carrying out such an attack can be seen as “high” 
because with the proper commands or malware they could take control of the entire 
system, however from a technical stand point this is pretty much impossible when using 
an RFID framework that complies with EPC standards.  Although the impact of such a 
threat could be seen as “high” we simply cannot declare this as a critical risk because of 
the implemented filtering techniques and the unlikely ability to overcome them.  
Therefore we declare this as a “minor” threat.34
Discovery Service
Currently Accada and Singularity do not have a discovery service implemented 
into their framework, however future releases will most likely integrate this service 
using the Object Name Service (ONS).  The basic operation of ONS is to determine a 
URL which allows a partner company to access EPC data from a retailer or 
manufacturer using the information stored on an EPC tag in URI form.  ONS is a subset 
of functions of the Domain Name service (DNS) and therefore will also have the same 
known security vulnerabilities.  Since ONS is used by all frameworks in pretty much the 
same way, the examination of Discovery Service threats in [42] are general to all RFID
frameworks.  Therefore the following threat analysis of the discovery service will be a 
brief overview with a few added threat possibilities.  We encourage the reader to refer to 
[1] and [42] for a more elaborate explanation. 
Discovery Service threats
Spoofing
The two options available for a spoofing attack are impersonating an external 
application or to imitate the ONS/DNS server.  The main objective here is to obtain 
valid URLs to determine what products are certain company has.  If an attacker seized
valid URLs they could sell the information to a rival company or thief.  Therefore we can 
rank the motivation of such an attack as “high” as well as a “possible” likelihood since 
the technical difficulties are “solvable” using known DNS security flaws.  The impact of 
such an attack can be seen as “high” since this will cause financial loss from a thief and it 35
could also give the advantage to a competitor eventually resulting in loss of revenue.  
Therefore the resulting risk is seen as “critical” and should be dealt with appropriately.
Tampering with data
An attacker may try to tamper with data by attempting to impersonate an 
ONS/DNS server by intercepting queries to a legitimate company’s server and respond 
with false URLs.  Sending the false information to the company will result in a loss of 
trust between the two partners.  The difficulties associated with this threat are seen as 
“solvable” using known exploits such as hijacking or manipulation of queries and offers 
the attacker a “moderate” motivation resulting in a “possible” likelihood.  The impact is 
seen as “medium” since the company will be providing company information to an 
illegitimate user using the false URLs.  Along with this the reputation of the company 
will be affected causing this threat to be considered as a “major” risk.
If we were to consider similar attacks discussed in the middleware threats we 
can see that with these false URLs an attacker could theoretically inject an SQL 
command into the false EPC data which will later be store in the database or possibly 
create a buffer flow.  Although this seems possible, as explained before the filtering 
mechanisms used in an EPCglobal standardized framework tend to deal with these 
types of threats as well having software written in a language unaffected by buffer 
overflows like java.36
Repudiation
With the very limited amount of tracing and auditing services an attacker could 
potentially perform illegal operations on the ONS/DNS server of a company through an 
external application.  We can rate the motivation of such a threat as “moderate” because 
now the attacker could offer these services to partners or customers of the company.  
This results in a “possible” likelihood based on the fact that the difficulties associated 
with this threat are “solvable”.  This will also have a “medium” impact on the company 
resulting in “major” risk.
Information disclosure
As previously discussed in the spoofing threat impersonating an external 
application or imitating the ONS/DNS server is a “solvable” difficulty through known 
DNS flaws.  Therefore by seizing valid URLs an attacker can gain access to EPC 
information of that company.  The motivation behind such an attack is “high” since 
obtaining information is the main reason this threat is taking place.  The information will 
allow the attacker to have some financial gain by selling it to a competitor rendering this 
a “possible” threat.  This disclosure of information will have a “high” impact classifying 
this as a “critical” risk.
Denial of Service
Known security flaws in DNS make the difficulty of a DoS attack “solvable”.  
Seeing as this is fairly simple to overcome, the motivation towards such an attack is 
“moderate” if this DoS attack is performed by someone working for a competitor.  This 
will have a “medium” impact on the company based on possible small financial loss and 37
the disruption on discovery services.  This results in a “possible” attack with a “major” 
risk.
Elevation of privilege
Possible elevation of privileges threats involve SQL injections or buffer overflows 
using illegitimate URLs as mentioned above.  Although the technical difficulties are still 
seen as “strong” to overcome the motivation would be considered as “high” because the 
attacker can benefit from having more access to the system in multiple ways.  The 
impact is considered as “high” because unauthorized users will be granted access to 
valuable business information and also possible to take control over the entire system.  
Although with an “unlikely” possibility of performing elevation of privileges we can 
still rank this as a “critical” risk and must be dealt with accordingly.
Threat Motivation Difficulty Likelihood Impact Risk
Spoofing of identity High Solvable Possible High Critical
Tampering with data Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Repudiation Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Information disclosure High Solvable Possible High Critical
Denial of service Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Elevation of privilege High Strong Unlikely High Critical
Table 2: Discovery service threat analysis
Information Services
Accada: EPCIS module
The EPC Information Services (EPCIS) is responsible for receiving application 
specific RFID data and translating it into the proper business events and by making 38
these events available.  The EPCIS is made up of 3 different parts: A capturing 
application used to interpret the captured RFID data from the filtering and collection 
middleware, an EPCIS repository to store all the EPCIS events, and an accessing 
application to retrieve EPCIS events from the repository.
EPCIS capturing application
The role of the capturing application is to collect unidentified RFID data.  The 
capturing application also has the responsibility of organizing each unidentified RFID
data that has been captured into one single EPCIS event.  Implementations of the 
capturing application can be done in various ways depending on the need for accessing 
business information from the collected RFID data.  For example consider a retail store 
that just received the new shipment of sneakers that they were waiting for.  The 
capturing application would receive the sneaker RFID data but would not know what to 
do with it.  If the sneaker manufacturer trusts the retailer they will be granted access to 
historical data through their accessing application by first determining the relative URL 
address through ONS.  Accada has chosen to create a simple capturing application 
which does not receive external data from partnered companies and therefore does not 
use ONS.  However in future Accada release they plan on integrating this service.  
Accada’s capturing application allows for multiple subscriptions to one or more filtering 
and collection instances.  For each type of subscription a simple template will be made to 
transform every ALE event from the filtering and collection middleware into a single 
EPCIS event that will later be stored in the relational database through the EPCIS 
repository.  Accada has facilitated the use of the capturing application by providing a 
graphical user interface39
EPCIS repository
In simple terms, the EPCIS repository is used to store EPCIS events that have 
been captured.  This is done by creating an EPC compliant network interface between 
the relational database and the capturing and accessing applications.  The interfaces 
used by the repository are the capturing and query interfaces.  The capturing interface
provides a path to transfer EPCIS events between the capturing application and other 
roles that require it such as the EPCIS repository and the internal/external accessing 
applications.  This is done by using a TCP/HTTP connection between the capturing 
application and the repository to transfer information.  The query interface is used to 
transfer queries between the EPCIS repository and internal/external accessing 
applications and returns the results.  This is done by using a SOAP protocol between the 
two to pass and return the needed information.  Both interfaces also use a TCP/HTTP 
connection for the notification channel.  Currently Accada uses MySQL as means to 
create their relational database which is linked to the EPCIS repository.
EPCIS accessing application
The accessing application is the main software that carries out the overall 
business processes such as shipping and receiving, warehouse management, and 
relaying historical EPCIS data to partner companies.  Since this is not a part of the 
general middleware it is not included in the Accada software, however it can be 
implemented.  If there is trust between two companies they may grant minimal access to 
each others accessing application.  With this, proper EPC business information can be 
accessed and can be applied to the internal EPCIS repository.  As previously described 
in the discovery service we access the company’s external application by first obtaining 40
the address as to where this information is stored through ONS.  Using this address we 
can access all the needed information associated with the EPC information from the 
partner’s repository.  Accada has included a client graphical user interface for easy 
access to the implemented accessing application.
Singularity: EPCIS
Singularity’s EPCIS runs in a similar way to Accada by receiving the captured 
EPC information from the EPM through standard web-services like SOAP.  The added 
feature included in Singularity is known as an Enterprise Service Bus (ESB).  This ESB 
encapsulates the EPCISs of an enterprise to allow access throughout the system.  
Therefore a company that consists of multiple retail stores and/or multiple 
manufacturing buildings can then access EPCIS information from any location. 
EPCIS threats
In the case of information service Accada, Singularity and other RFID framework 
support bindings such as SOAP/HTTP are used for authentication and authorization.  
This process includes authenticating the identity of the application issuing or requesting 
EPCIS data and from here we can authorize the application to access the information 
relevant to them.  Although the bindings are supported by current RFID frameworks, 
EPCglobal leaves them as an optional feature and therefore do not need to be 
implemented.  As mentioned by [1], without properly identifying applications accessing 
EPCIS information from the database we open the possibility to the previous threats 
occurring.  Therefore in a worst case scenario our threat results will correlate with those 
found in the Discovery service.41
Threat Motivation Difficulty Likelihood Impact Risk
Spoofing of identity High Solvable Possible High Critical
Tampering with data Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Repudiation Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Information disclosure High Solvable Possible High Critical
Denial of service Moderate Solvable Possible Medium Major
Elevation of privilege High Strong Unlikely High Critical
Table 3: Information service threat analysis
Conclusion
By continuing with research development and adopting current features 
available to these frameworks we hope to apply the RFID technology to the supply 
chain and other areas with minimal risk to companies and end users.  Recent research 
regarding security and privacy of RFID systems has brought great improvements 
towards real world applications.  Implementations of various cryptographic algorithms 
such as SHA-256, SHA-1, MD5, AES-128, and ECC-192 have all been discussed in [6] to 
deal with the tag and reader relationship security issues.  Solutions towards the 
Discovery service include such things as DNSSEC, TLS/SSL and VPNs.
In the near future RFID tags will be implemented into various items not only to 
be used to identify the product but also to offer ingenious services to the user.  Imagine 
in a few years going over to your fridge and having it remind you that you are out of 
milk or buying a casserole dinner equipped with an RFID tag containing cooking 
instructions that can be appropriately handled by your oven or microwave.  All of these 
innovative ideas are not too far off, we simply need to consider the risks involved and 
strategize ways to counteract against them.42
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